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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the extent to which the impact of tax policy on consumer spending differs
between temporary and permanent, as well as anticipated and unanticipated tax changes.  To discriminate
between them, we use institutional information such as legal distinction between temporary and permanent
tax changes, as well as timing of policy announcement and implementation.  We find that the impact of
temporary changes is significantly smaller than the impact of permanent changes.  We also find that more
than 80 per cent of Japanese consumers, including those who distinguish between temporary and permanent
tax changes, respond to tax changes at the time of their implementation and not at the time of a policy
announcement.  We suggest an interpretation that these consumers follow a near-rational decision rule.
Katsunori Watanabe Takayuki Watababe
Research and Statistics Department  International Department
Bank of Japan Bank of Japan









1.  Introduction   The Japanese government has been regarding reductions in individual income
tax as one of the major policy tools to stimulate the economy.  The government implemented an
income tax reduction of 5.5 trillion yen in 1994 and continued tax reductions of the same size until
the end of 1996 (see Table 1).  In early 1997, the focus of economic policy temporarily shifted to
the rapid accumulation of public debt.  However, it was not long before the Hashimoto
administration was forced to announce a temporary tax reduction of 2 trillion yen for CY1998 to
stimulate consumer spending, which had been deteriorating since April 1997.  Moreover, on April
24, 1998, the Hashimoto administration announced a policy package, “Comprehensive Economic
Measures,” which included another tax reduction of 2 trillion yen.
The total tax reductions during 1993 to 1998 amounted to 28 trillion yen.  Even taking into
account the additional tax revenue from the consumption tax increase in April 1997, the tax policy
in these six years increased public debt by 21 trillion yen.  These large-scale tax reductions can be
viewed as unprecedented fiscal experiments.  The purpose of this paper is to investigate Japanese
consumers’ responses to these changes in taxes.
The focus of the paper is on the effectiveness of tax policy.  First, we are interested in the
difference between temporary and permanent tax reductions in their effects on consumer spending.
According to the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), the impact of a temporary tax cut on
permanent income, and therefore on consumer spending, is limited.  The prediction of the PIH
seems to be consistent with the Japanese experience: the impacts of temporary tax cuts in 1994–
1998 were said to be limited, in spite of their large size.  Based on such experience, many
politicians and researchers, both inside and outside the country, have been arguing that the tax
reduction that is to commence in the spring of 1999, should be a permanent one.3
Second, we are interested in the impact of tax cuts on consumer spending at the time of a
policy announcement.  The PIH again provides a clear prediction: consumers increase their
spending at the time of a policy announcement, but there is no effect at the time of its
implementation.  The fiscal experiments in 1993–1998, however, provide evidence against the
prediction.  A typical example is the consumption tax increase in April 1997, which was announced
in September 1994, 30 months before the enforcement.  If the PIH holds, we should have observed
a decrease in consumer spending in September 1994, and no change in April 1997.  Contrary to the
prediction, however, consumer spending decreased significantly in April 1997.
1  Many researchers
insist that the implementation of the consumption tax increase in April 1997 triggered further
deterioration of the Japanese economy in 1997 and 1998.  Does this episode mean that most of the
Japanese are rule-of-thumb consumers who decide the level of spending according to current
income rather than permanent income?
To address the two issues above, we need a data set that allows us to discriminate between
temporary and permanent, as well as unanticipated and anticipated, changes in taxes.  Such a data
set permits us to estimate what types of tax changes took place and when.
The core of our empirical strategy is to use institutional information about the tax systems in
identifying various types of shock.  For example, tax reductions in Japan can be classified into two
categories: “institutional tax reductions” and “special tax reductions.”  The former is a tax reform in
which the laws concerning income tax rates, as well as various allowances, are amended; the latter
                                                
1 The consumption tax increase has not only the income effect, which we focus on here, but also the
substitution effect.  For instance, researchers often point out that the decrease in consumption in April 19974
is a change in tax credit that is effective only for a specific year.  This institutional information
allows researchers to distinguish between temporary and permanent tax reductions.  More
importantly, it is probably safe to assume that consumers had the same belief about the distinction
between temporary and permanent tax reductions.
2
The distinction between unanticipated and anticipated changes in taxes is more subtle than
that between temporary and permanent ones.  Given that policy decisions are made over time in the
process of political negotiation, it is not easy to pinpoint an exact date on which a consumer’s belief
about the future course of tax policy is revised.
3  However, it is still possible to estimate it by
looking carefully at the sequence of the events involved.  To be more concrete, it is probably
natural to assume that consumers revise their beliefs about a change in taxes at the timing of major
events such as: (1) the tax advisory commission of the Prime Minister making a policy
recommendation; (2) the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) tax committee submitting, to the
government, a proposal for the reform; (3) the Cabinet approving the proposal; and (4) the Diet
approving the bill.
                                                                                                                                                                
was at least partially due to the reversal in the stepped-up demand in and before March 1997.  We will
consider this substitution effect in the section of empirical analysis.
2 Of course, not all consumers have enough time to read the laws carefully.  In addition, ‘intelligent’
consumers, who observe the economy is getting worse, might have an expectation that a special tax
reduction will be rolled over in the next year or even longer.  As shown later in the section of empirical
analysis, however, the data suggest that most Japanese consumers distinguish between temporary and
permanent tax changes as written in the laws.
3 An exception is Prime Minister Hashimoto’s sudden announcement in December 1997 about the special
tax reduction for 1998.  This was ‘news’ to almost all consumers, because the Prime Minister made the
decision without consulting many politicians and bureaucrats, but such top-down decision-making is rare in
Japan.5
Our “institutional information” approach differs from the time-series approach, which is
adopted in many empirical studies on consumer behaviour (see, for example, Flavin 1981).  For
example, the time-series approach extracts unanticipated fluctuations in disposable income as the
residuals of the time-series model.  Although the residuals represent the unanticipated part of
fluctuations in disposable income for those researchers who make a forecast using the time-series
model, there is no guarantee that the same thing is true for consumers; they might have more
information than is expressed by the time-series model.  Moreover, if one wants to decompose
fluctuations in disposable income into temporary and permanent changes using the time-series
method, one has to impose some strong assumptions.
4  The “institutional information” approach,
which requires relatively weak assumptions to discriminate between anticipated and unanticipated,
as well as permanent and temporary, changes in taxes and social security contributions, is suitable
to the study of the impacts of those changes.
Our institutional information approach is similar to that adopted by Poterba (1988), who
carefully picks out two episodes of temporary income tax shocks in the U.S. (1968 surtax and 1975
income tax rebate) to study consumers’ response to them at the time of their implementation.  He
finds that consumers’ response to temporary tax shocks was much larger than predicted by the PIH,
interpreting this as an evidence of consumers’ myopic behaviour.  In addition, he looks at
consumption response at the time of policy announcement, which is defined as the month of
congressional passage of tax bill, but fails to detect any statistically significant impacts of policy
                                                
4 Many ways to decompose fluctuations in disposable income into temporary and permanent changes exist,
so it is impossible to choose one among them without imposing some restrictions (see, for example, Quah
1990).6
announcement.
5  Japanese data set that contains more than forty episodes of tax shock allows us to
conduct Poterba’s exercise in way that is more efficient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the institutional information
and our empirical approach; and Section 3 presents regression results.  Through a careful
examination of the contemporaneous relationship between various types of tax innovations and
monthly changes in aggregate consumption, we find that the impact of temporary tax changes is
significantly smaller than the impact of permanent tax changes.  We also find that more than 80 per
cent of Japanese consumers, including forward-looking consumers who distinguish between
temporary and permanent tax changes, respond to tax changes not at the timing of the policy
announcement, but at the timing of its implementation.  We suggest an interpretation that forward-
looking consumers who ignore policy announcements follow a near-rational decision rule.  To
reinforce this interpretation, the consumers’ utility cost of ignoring policy announcements is
estimated in Section 4.  The estimated utility cost is less than 0.1 per cent of the PIH consumption.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.  Empirical strategy
2.1.  Institutional information    Our data set contains 43 episodes of changes in national
income tax, local income tax, consumption tax, and social security contribution.
6  The sample
                                                
5 Our approach is also similar, at least in spirit, to Wilcox (1989), who uses the institutional information that
the statutory changes in social security benefits are announced at least six weeks in advance of the payable
date.
6 There are two kinds of individual income tax in Japan: “Individual income tax” and “individual
inhabitant’s tax.”  The former taxes are collected by the central government, whereas the latter taxes are7
period is 1975 to 1998.  For each of these episodes, the data set contains institutional information
on: (1) the date of announcement; (2) the date of implementation; (3) the size of changes; and (4)
the distinction between temporary and permanent changes.
Table A1 gives the details of the data set.  The first column, labelled “Date of
implementation”, shows the date on which changes in the disposable income occurred, reflecting
changes in taxes and social security contributions.
The column labelled “Date of announcement” presents the date on which the LDP tax
committee submitted a proposal report to the government, “Outline of tax reform,” describing the
details of the reform.  Consumers are thought to revise their beliefs about a tax reform at the timing
of the major events, such as: (1) the tax advisory commission of the Prime Minister making a
policy recommendation; (2) the LDP tax committee submitting the “Outline of tax reform” to the
government; (3) the Cabinet approving the proposal; and (4) the Diet approving the bill.  We regard
the second event as “announcement” because it provides consumers with a significant amount of
information about future tax reform.
7
                                                                                                                                                                
collected by the local governments.  In this paper, “individual income tax” is referred as national income tax,
and “individual inhabitant’s tax” is referred as local income tax.  See Appendix A for a description of the
major tax reforms in Japan during the post-war period, and see Appendix B for an outline of the Japanese
social insurance system.
7 The second event is more informative than the other three events.  The report made by the tax advisory
commission of the Prime Minister provides the grand design of the reform, not the details of the reform.
Therefore, it is impossible for consumers to know from the report how much their tax burden will change.
The third event almost always takes place within two weeks after the second event, which implies that the
third event is a ‘ceremony’ that provides no additional information to consumers.  The fourth event seems to
be a strong competitor to the second event.  In reality, however, there is no example in the 1990s in which
the bills reflecting the proposal contained in “Outline of tax reform” were rejected by the Diet and thus it is8
The column labelled “Estimated size” reports the size of the changes in taxes and social
security contributions for the average “worker household” in the Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (FIES),
8 which is the source of the monthly consumption data used in the empirical analysis
of Section 3.  A “worker household” is defined in the FIES as a household whose head is on a
payroll.  The size of a change in income taxes for the average worker household is primarily
determined by its annual labour income and family size.  We take both of them from the FIES and
estimate the size of changes in income taxes, following the formulae described in the laws.  The
size of a change in consumption tax is estimated by multiplying the total of expenditures on taxable
items, which are taken from the FIES, by the percentage change in the consumption tax rate.  The
size of a change in social security contributions, which is primarily determined by the annual labour
income of the average worker household, is estimated following the formulae described in the
corresponding laws.
The fourth column indicates the type of institutional change: 21 episodes of changes in
national income tax; 15 episodes of changes in local income tax; two episodes of changes in
consumption tax; and five episodes of changes in social security contribution.
The fifth column indicates the legal distinction between temporary and permanent changes.
There are 18 episodes of temporary changes and 25 episodes of permanent changes.  All of the
changes in social security contributions and consumption taxes are permanent ones.  As to national
                                                                                                                                                                
safe to assume that the fourth event does not provide any significant amount of additional information to
consumers.
8 This survey is a monthly diary survey conducted by the Management and Coordination Agency of the
Japanese government.  It covers about 8000 households, one-sixth of which are replaced by new households
every month.9
and local income taxes, permanent large-scale tax reductions were implemented in 1975, 1977,
1984, 1989 and 1995.  Most of the temporary tax reductions (13 episodes out of 18) were
implemented in the post-bubble period.
We construct four time-series variables that summarize the institutional information
described in Table A1.  For episode i, the month of implementation is denoted by ti; the month of
announcement by ti-ti; and the size of change, which is deflated by the Consumer Price Index and
divided by the average household’s real labour income in the previous month, is denoted by xi.
Denote the total number of episodes by n (n = 43), and rearrange the order of the episodes so that i
= 1 to m represent the episodes of permanent changes and i = m+1 to n represent those of temporary
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The superscripts I and A represent ‘implementation’ and ‘announcement’, respectively, and the
superscripts P and T represent ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’, respectively.  The variable v
IP (v
IT)
represents when and how much permanent (temporary) changes are implemented.  Similarly, the
variable v
AP (v
AT) represents when and how much permanent (temporary) changes are announced.
Note that the size of change, xi, is transformed into the value evaluated at the month of10
announcement, ti-ti, by multiplying by b0
ti, as shown on the right-hand side of equations (1.3) and
(1.4).
2.2.  Four types of consumers    The institutional information in our data set tells us when and
how much changes in taxes and social security contributions are announced and implemented, as
well as whether those changes are temporary or permanent.  It allows us to identify four types of
consumers.  The first type consists of consumers who adjust their consumption according to current
disposable income and, therefore, are labelled “current income consumers.”  They do not
distinguish between temporary and permanent changes and respond not at the timing of
announcement but at the timing of implementation.  Consumers of the second type, labelled
“permanent income consumers,” distinguish between temporary and permanent changes and adjust
their responses depending on the persistence of shock.  They respond to changes in taxes only at the
timing of announcement.  The third type, called “near-rational consumers,” distinguishes between
temporary and permanent changes and responds not at the timing of announcement but at the
timing of implementation.  Finally, the fourth type, labelled “Ricardian consumers,” does not
respond at all to changes in taxes.
We make two remarks about the above classification of consumers.  First, why do
permanent-income consumers and near-rational consumers respond to changes in taxes?  One
explanation is that they simply fail to recognize government’s intertemporal budget constraint.  An
alternative explanation is that, although they recognize the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint, they have a belief that the government will finance tax reductions by cutting future11
expenditures.  Unless otherwise indicated, the arguments in the rest of the paper will be based on
the second interpretation.
As long as we interpret the behaviour of the second and third type in this way, both are
forward-looking consumers.  In this respect, there is no distinction between these two types and the
fourth type.  However, they differ in their expectations about how tax reduction today will be
financed in the future.  The second and third types expect that the government will cut future
expenditures to finance today’s tax reduction, while the fourth type expects that the government
will increase tax burdens in the future without changing government expenditures.
Second, why do near-rational consumers ignore policy announcements, although they take
into consideration the persistence of shocks in deciding their responses?  An explanation is that
they follow a near-rational decision rule, as suggested by Cochrane (1989),
9 in which the utility
gained by using policy announcements to better adjust consumption does not outweigh the costs of
obtaining and processing the information.  Therefore, they choose not to respond at the timing of
the policy announcement.  On the other hand, the utility gained by distinguishing between
temporary and permanent tax changes is large relative to the costs.
                                                
9 The idea of near-rationality was proposed by Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, b) and applied to the consumer
behaviour by Cochrane (1989) and Caballero (1995).  Cochrane (1989) interprets the excess sensitivity of
consumption as a near-rational decision rule in an environment where the costs of obtaining and processing
information are not negligible.  In Caballero’s (1995) model, consumers do not adjust their consumption
until the deviation from the theoretical level, computed from the permanent income, reaches a pre-specified
trigger point, because the cost of such inaction is small in utility terms.  His model is supported by U.S. data.
Shea (1995), in an empirical analysis using panel data, finds that consumption is more sensitive to large
absolute expected wage changes than to small expected wage changes and concludes that this is inconsistent
with near-rationality.12
For example, suppose that the LDP tax committee releases a report recommending a special
tax reduction to be implemented in six months.  In our definition, this is regarded as a policy
announcement.  The announcement provides detailed information about how much money will be
refunded to a worker depending upon his/her annual income, family size, etc.  The worker has the
ability to calculate the amount of special tax reduction he/she will receive, but the costs in time and
effort are not negligible.  On the other hand, what would be obtained from the calculation?  The
worker could revise his/her permanent disposable income based on the calculation and adjust
his/her spending six months earlier, thereby succeeding in consumption smoothing.  If he/she were
very smart, like the second type of consumer, the costs of the calculation would be smaller than the
utility gained by the prompt adjustment.  Otherwise, the best strategy would be to wait for the next
six months to see what information becomes available on the exact amount of special tax
reductions.
10
It is important to note that the behaviour of near-rational consumers is consistent with two
regularities repeatedly observed in empirical studies on consumer behaviour: excess smoothness
and excess sensitivity of consumption.  Their behaviour is excessively smooth in the sense that they
ignore policy announcements,
11 and, at the same time, it is excessively sensitive, in the sense that
they respond to predictable, or already announced, changes in taxes and social security
                                                
10 An alternative explanation of the behaviour of the third type of consumers is that the policy announcement
lacks credibility for some reason, so that the consumers do not respond to it.  The theoretical possibility of
this cannot be denied, but it is not realistic in our setting.  Given that the LDP releases a report after a series
of hard political negotiations, the probability of failure would be quite small.
11 Note that this definition of excess smoothness is stronger than that of Campbell and Deaton (1989).  See
Deaton (1992) for more on the difference between the two definitions.13
contributions.  Also, note that it is consistent with the response of the Japanese consumers to the
pre-announced increase in the consumption tax rate in April 1997.
2.3.  Derivation of an estimating equation    The empirical analysis of the paper aims to
estimate the fractions of each type of consumer, as well as the discount factor.  Estimating them
leads to answering the questions raised in Section 1: (1) how much difference there is between
temporary and permanent changes; and (2) whether consumers respond to policy announcements.
Let Cit (i=1, 2, 3, 4), Yt, Dt denote, respectively, the per-household real consumption of type
i consumer, the per-household real labour income, and the per-household real disposable income.
Here we assume that the consumer type is unrelated to income, so that the variables Y and D are not
a function of i.  The variables DCit, DYt, and DDt, represent monthly changes.  We divide DCit, DYt,
and DDt by Yt-1 for scaling, and express the corresponding variables by Dcit, Dyt, and Ddt.
Under the assumption that the subjective discount rate is equal to the real interest rate and
that the instantaneous utility function is quadratic, monthly changes in consumption of each type is
expressed by
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represents the annuity value of revisions in the expected labour income stream.
To illustrate the implications of equations (2.1) to (2.4), we compare the responses of each
type of consumer to a permanent/temporary tax reduction of one thousand yen.  According to
equation (2.1), current income consumers increase their consumption by one thousand yen,
irrespective of whether it is a permanent or a temporary tax reduction.  Equation (2.2), combined
with equations (1.3) and (1.4), states that permanent income consumers increase their consumption
by b0
t thousand yen in response to a permanent tax reduction, but they increase consumption by (1-
b0)b0
t thousand yen in response to a temporary one (t represents the interval between an
announcement and its implementation).  Note that, since b0 is less than but close to one, b0
t is close
to one while (1-b0)b0
t is close to zero.  This means that the impact of a temporary tax reduction is
limited relative to a permanent one.
12  Equation (2.3) says that near-rational consumers increase
their consumption by one thousand yen in response to a permanent tax reduction, but they increase
their consumption by (1-b0)  thousand yen in response to a temporary reduction.  Finally, equation
(2.4) says that Ricardian consumers have no response to changes in taxes.
Let l denote the fraction of the aggregate income that accrues to current income consumers.
The amounts of the remainder, 1-l, that accrue to permanent income consumers, near-rational
consumers and Ricardian consumers are (1-l)f1, (1-l)f2 and (1-l)(1-f1-f2), respectively.  The
monthly change in the real consumption of the average household, denoted by Dct, is expressed as:15
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IT = + - ( ) 1 0 b and et is the error term.  The second equality
follows from equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4).  The equation to be estimated in Section 3 is a less
restrictive version of equation (3):
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Note that b1 and b2 could be different from b0, which is used in the construction of vts in equations
(1.3) and (1.4).  Also, note that equation (4) reduces to equation (3) when b0=b1=b2.
2.4.  Econometric issue    Before we estimate the model, we need to consider the
contemporaneous correlation between Ddt and ut.
Since changes in current disposable income contain information about the total lifetime
income, the two variables Ddt and ut are almost certainly correlated.  When Ddt takes a positive
value, ut is expected to have a positive value.  In this case, estimating equation (4) by ordinary
least-squares (OLS) regression, which regards l2ut+et as the error term, leads to biased estimators
for the parameters.  One way to deal with this problem is to construct a proxy for ut and add it to
the list of independent variables.  To be more specific, we first estimate a univariate time-series
model for the growth rate of real labour income, Dyt, and use the series of residuals as a proxy
                                                                                                                                                                
12 Note that both b0
t and (1-b0)b0
t are smaller for larger t.  Thus, the announcement effect of a tax reduction
to be implemented in the distant future is very small.16
variable.
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where a new parameter, q , is defined by
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which represents the degree of persistence of innovations in the growth rate of real labour income.
14
We use this estimation method in the regression analysis of Section 3.
The above two-step procedure might fail if $ ut is not a good proxy for ut.
15  An alternative
way to estimate equation (4), without constructing a proxy variable, is to regard l2ut+et of equation
(4) as the error term and estimate equation (4) using an instrumental variable for Ddt involving
lagged variables, as proposed by Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990, 1991).  In Section 3, we also
use this method to check that the regression results do not depend crucially on the estimation
method.
                                                
13 Since changes in the consumption tax are already included in v
AP and v
IP, we must make sure that the same
innovations are not contained in  $ ut .  We do this by: (1) removing the effects of changes in the consumption
tax from the series of the CPI; (2) constructing the adjusted series of the real income by deflating the
nominal income by the CPI constructed in (1); and (3) estimating a time-series model for the log of the
adjusted real income.
14 See, for example, Quah (1990) for more details on this point.
15 More generally, it is known that in the two-step procedure such as this (i.e. imputing unobserved
regressors from an auxiliary econometric model), the second-step estimated standard errors and related test
statistics are incorrect.  See Murphy and Topel (1985) for more on this issue.17
3.  Empirical results
3.1.  Preliminary analysis    Table 2 presents the mean of monthly changes in propensity to
consume out of labour income.  The sample period, 1975:01 to 1998:06, is divided into sub-
samples according to the sign of vt
I or vt
A .  The row labelled “vt
I <0” shows the mean of monthly
changes in propensity to consume in months when tax reductions are implemented.  For example,
the mean value for “all items” is +0.00288, which is significantly larger than the no-implementation
mean value at the five per cent level.  On the other hand, in months whenvt
I is positive, that is, a tax
(or social security contributions) increase is implemented, the mean of monthly changes in
propensity to consume for all items is significantly smaller than that for the no-implementation
mean value at the five per cent level.  The tendency that the propensity to consume is higher in
months when tax reductions are implemented, and lower in months when tax increases are
implemented, is observed not only for “all items” but also for the subcategories “non-durables and
services” and “durables.”
The row labelled “vt
A <0” shows the mean of monthly changes in propensity to consume in
months when tax reductions are announced.  The figure for all items is significantly smaller than
that for the no-announcement mean value at the 10 per cent level, which contradicts the hypothesis
that the announcements of tax reductions stimulate consumer spending.  It is important to note that
consumer spending on durables increases in response to the announcements of tax reductions, while
spending on non-durables and services decreases.  In months when vt
A is positive, the figure for all18
items is significantly smaller than that for the no-announcement mean value at the five per cent
level.
In summary, the above simple analyses seem to indicate that the implementation of tax
changes has a significant impact on consumer spending, but the policy announcement does not.  In
particular, the data indicate that the announcement of tax reductions is not effective in stimulating
consumer spending.
3.2.  Baseline regression results    Table 3 presents estimates for the parameters of equations
(5) and (4).  We use the monthly data from 1975:01 to 1998:06.  The variables vt and  $ ut  are
constructed as described in Section 2; and the variables Dct and Ddt are constructed using the
monthly series of per-household total expenditure and the corresponding series of disposable
income, both being taken from the FIES.
16  The FIES provides monthly per-household expenditures
by item, but we use total expenditure as the dependent variable, unless otherwise indicated, because
our main interest is in the effect of tax changes on total spending, rather than that on expenditure on
specific items.
Estimation method used is non-linear least squares (NLLS) or two-stage least squares
(2SLS).  In addition to the independent variables listed on the right-hand side of equations (5) and
(4), we include intercepts and the two dummy variables associated with changes in the
                                                
16 The variables Dct and Ddt are constructed as follows: (1) deflate the original (i.e., non-seasonally-adjusted)
series of consumption and disposable income by the CPI; (2) estimate a univariate seasonal ARIMA model
for the log of the real consumption and for the log of the real disposable income; (3) construct a seasonally-
adjusted series by the signal extraction method; (4) transform the two seasonally-adjusted series into original
units; (5) take the first difference and divide by the real income in the previous month for scaling.19
consumption tax rate.  One of the two dummies represents the stepped-up demand before the
introduction of the consumption tax in April 1989, as well as its reversal effects.  It takes the value
of +1 in 1989:03 and -1 in 1989:04.  The other dummy, which is associated with the increase in the
consumption tax rate in April 1997, takes the value of +1 in 1997:03 and -1 in 1997:04.  The
discount factor used in the construction of the vts in equations (1.3) and (1.4) is set at b0=0.99,
unless otherwise indicated.
The first column of Table 3 shows the result for the specification in which no parameter
restriction is imposed.  All of the six coefficients are positive and less than one, which is consistent
with theoretical expectations.  The estimate of l is 0.24, which means that 24 per cent of Japanese
households are current income consumers.
17
The coefficient f1 represents the fraction of permanent income consumers who respond
appropriately to policy announcements.  The estimate of f1 was 0.59, with standard error of 0.62,
so the hypothesis that f1 is equal to zero cannot be rejected.  The Japanese aggregate consumption
is excessively smooth in this sense.
  18  On the other hand, the coefficient f2 represents the fraction
of near-rational consumers who respond to the pre-announced changes in taxes and social security
                                                
17 Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990, 1991) estimates l, the fraction of current income consumers, by
regressing Dct on Ddt, by using an instrumental variable for Ddt, involving lagged variables.  We estimate l
following their method to find that the estimate of l is 0.2887, with the standard error of 0.1149.  This is
close to the estimates shown in Table 3.
18 In interpreting the result that f1 is close to zero, we should note the possibility that our definition of the
time of announcement might be imprecise.  Our regression is based on the assumption that consumers revise
their beliefs on the day when the LDP tax committee submits the “outline of tax reform,” but they might20
contributions, so that f2 can be interpreted as the measure of the excess sensitivity of consumption.
The estimate of f2 is close to one and nearly twice its standard error.  Japanese consumption is
excessively sensitive in this sense.  The sum of f1 and f2 is well above one (f1+f2=1.57), and the
Wald test fails to reject the null hypothesis that f1+f2=1 (p-value=0.4693).  In other words, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the fraction of Ricardian consumers, 1-f1-f2, is equal to zero.
The discount factors, b1 and b2, are both close to one, and significantly different from zero.
Thus, both permanent income consumers and near-rational consumers distinguish temporary and
permanent changes, and respond differently depending on whether it is temporary or permanent.
According to the estimates of b1, for example, permanent income consumers increase their
spending by about 180 yen to a temporary tax reduction of 10,000 yen, while they increase it by
about 10,000 yen for a permanent tax reduction of the same size.  The finding that the estimates of
the discount factor are close to one is consistent with the anecdotal evidence concerning the
responses of Japanese consumers to special tax reductions.  For example, according to a survey
conducted by the Nikkei, the fraction of the consumers who spent the tax refund of 1997 was 43
per cent, while the remaining 57 per cent saved it, recognizing that it was a temporary tax
reduction.
The second and third columns of Table 3 show the regression results when additional
restrictions on coefficients are imposed: b1=b2 for the second column; b1=b2 and f1+f2=1 for the
third column.  We observe in both cases that (1) l is about 0.24; (2) f1 is close to zero (excess
                                                                                                                                                                
revise their beliefs at a different stage in the legislative process.  If this is the case, the estimate of f1 is
biased to zero.21
smoothness) while f2 is close to one (excess sensitivity); (3) bs are between 0.9 and 1.0.  The basic
findings are unchanged if we impose a further restriction that b0, the discount factor used in the
construction of vts, coincides with b1 and b2.  (Regression results corresponding to this case are not
reported in the table.
19)
According to the estimates reported in the third column of Table 3, a permanent tax
reduction of 10,000 yen per month would increase the monthly spending of the average household
by about 1500 yen after the time of announcement of a policy change, and by an additional 8500
yen after the month of implementation.  By comparison, a one-time tax reduction of the same size
would increase the monthly spending by 150 yen during the months between the announcement and
its implementation, 3200 yen in the month of implementation, and 800 yen in or after the next
month.  The estimated impact of a temporary tax reduction is quite close to that reported in Poterba
(1988) and Blinder (1981): Poterba (1988) reports that a $1 temporary tax reduction increases
consumer spending by 12–24 cents, while Blinder (1981) gives the estimate of 16 cents per dollar
of temporary tax rebate.
The fourth to the sixth columns of Table 3 repeat the same set of regressions as the first
three columns, but the 2SLS method is used instead of NLLS, to rule out the possibility that $ ut
might not be a good proxy for ut, so that the regression results might be distorted.  The fourth
column re-estimates the specification [1], dropping  $ ut  from the list of independent variables and
using instrumental variables for Ddt, being the lags, Ddt-2,...,Ddt-6, Dct-2,...,Dct-6.  The estimated
coefficients, l and f2, are slightly larger than those before, but otherwise the results are similar to
                                                
19 We set b0 at a particular value, calculate the vts, and conduct a NLLS to obtain the estimates of b1 and b2.22
those reported in the first column.  The fifth and sixth columns of the table also corroborate the
regression results reported in the second and third columns.
3.3.  Sensitivity analysis    To check the robustness of the estimates obtained in the baseline
regression, we re-estimated the equations in several different ways.  The first column of Table 4
addresses the possibility that the estimates might be distorted by measurement errors contained in





IT.  We re-estimated the specification [2] of Table 3, using instrumental variables for the four
independent variables.  The instrumental variable corresponding to v
AP takes the value of +1 in
months when v
AP>0, -1 when v
AP<0 and zero otherwise, and the other three instrumental variables
were constructed in the same way.  The estimated results, which are presented in the first column of
Table 4, are similar to those reported in the second column of Table 3.  The estimate of f2 is
slightly smaller than before, but the Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis that the sum of f1
and f1 equals one.  The estimate of b1 is smaller than before, but still significantly different from
zero.  Other estimates are almost the same as before.
Next, we checked the possibility that the two dummy variables associated with changes in
the consumption tax rate might not capture the stepped-up demand before the tax-rate increases, as
well as its reversal effects.  We re-estimated the specification [2] of Table 3, deleting the
observations related to changes in the consumption tax rate: 1989:03, 1989:04, 1997:03, and
                                                                                                                                                                
We repeat this procedure until the value of b0 coincides with the estimates of b1 and b2.23
1997:04.  The results were similar to those reported in Table 3, except that the estimate of f1 was
slightly smaller than before.
We conducted the diagnostic test proposed by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) to test if the
estimated coefficients were affected by outliers.  We calculated DFBETASij, a scaled measure of
the change in the jth estimated coefficients that would occur if the ith observation were deleted.
This statistic is compared with the critical value, 2 / N , where N is the sample size.  The result of
the test (which is not shown on the table) indicated that the estimated coefficients were nearly
always stable, but a large change in the estimated coefficient of vt
AToccurred when we deleted the
observation for December 1997.
 20  The third column of Table 4 presents the regression results
when we deleted this observation.  The estimate of b1 showed a large change from 0.9418 to
0.8890, which is comparable with the standard error of the estimated coefficient.  Nevertheless, the
estimate of b1 was still significantly different from zero, so that it is reasonable to assert, even in
this case, that temporary changes in taxes have smaller impacts on consumer spending relative to
permanent changes.
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 4 address the possibility that the dependent variable in
the regression, the total expenditure, might not be an appropriate variable to represent ct in equation
(5), because it includes expenditures on durables.  To be more specific, the variable ct in equation
                                                
20 December 1997 is the month when people showed serious concern about the stability of the Japanese
financial system after observing two big failures: Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities.  On
the other hand, this is the month when the Prime Minister Hashimoto announced special tax reduction for
CY 1998 in an unusual way (see footnote 3).  The first event predicts a negative residual in this month while
the second events predicts a positive residual.  We consistently observe unusually large negative residual in
this month, which suggests that the financial disorder had a dominantly large impact.24
(5) should be consumption rather than expenditure, and the timing of consumption does not
necessarily coincide with that of expenditure for commodities with durability.  To deal with this
problem, we first re-estimate the specification [2] of Table 3, replacing the total expenditure by the
expenditure on “on-durables and services,” a sub-category available in the FIES.  According to the
regression results reported in the fourth column of Table 4, both f1 and f1 are smaller than before,
but the sum of the two is still above one and the Wald test rejects the null-hypothesis that f1+f1=1.
As pointed out by Mankiw (1982) and Hayashi (1985), however, even commodities labelled
as non-durables or services might have some durability, in the sense that the timing of expenditure
does not coincide with that of consumption.
21  To take this point into consideration explicitly,
following Mankiw (1982) and Hayashi (1985), we assume that current consumption on all
commodities, denoted by ct , is a Koyck-type distributed lag function of current and past
expenditures on all commodities:
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where L is the lag operator, and r is the coefficient representing the durability of consumption,
where 0£r£1.  Under this assumption, the equation (5) to be estimated changes to:
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21 For example, a special dinner at a restaurant is physically perishable and thus labelled “services” in the
FIES.  However, people may derive utility from the memory of the dinner, and, if so, expenditure on the
special dinner at a restaurant should be treated as if it were durable.  See Hayashi (1985) for more on this
issue.25
Equation (6) differs from (5) in that consumers overreact to changes in taxes in period t and
correct it in period t+1.  For example, equation (6) implies that permanent income consumers
would increase their expenditure by one yen in period t in response to the announcement of a
permanent tax reduction of one yen, and decrease them in period t+1 by r yen.
22  We estimate
equation (6) by NLLS using total expenditure as the dependent variable.  The regression results are
presented in the fifth column of Table 4, where standard errors are Newey-West estimators that are
robust to serial correlation in the error term.  Again we found no significant changes in the
estimated coefficients: both f1 and f1 were smaller than before but the Wald test still rejected the
null hypothesis that f1+f1=1.  The estimated value of r, 0.158, was fairly close to that obtained by
Hayashi (1985) using Japanese panel data, although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that r
equals zero because of the low precision of the estimator (standard error equal to 0.243).
23
Table 5 continues the sensitivity analysis.  We checked to see whether the estimates of f1
were biased toward zero, due to the contemporaneous correlation between v
A and e, through the so-
called “non-Keynesian effects of fiscal expansion.”
According to Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1995), fiscal expansions are sometimes
accompanied by decreases in private demand, particularly private consumption, because consumers
                                                
22 That is,  Dct =1, Dct+ = - 1 r , and  Dct j + = 0 for j>1.  It is easy to see that, given this stream of expenditure,
Dct = Dct+1= Dct+2 =...=1.
23 An alternative way to deal with the problem of consumption durability is to estimate equation (4) by 2SLS
using more than twice-lagged instruments, Ddt-2,...,Ddt-6, Dct-2,...,Dct-6.  Note that twice-lagged instruments
are uncorrelated with the error term, even if the error term was an AR(1) process.  Thus, the regression
results [4] to [6] of Table 3 are still valid even in the presence of consumption durability, as long as we use
the Newey-West estimator for standard errors.26
who observe fiscal expansions expect that their tax burden will be increased in the future to finance
additional government spending.
24  Incorporating this effect into our model, equation (5) changes
to:
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where gt represents the amount of additional government spending announced at t.  If the non-
Keynesian effect exists, the coefficient on gt, k, should be negative.
If gt is not correlated with other explanatory variables, we can safely ignore this variable in
estimating equation (5).  The variable gt is a part of the error term et of equation (5), which is
uncorrelated with other explanatory variables.  But, we have at least one reason to believe that v
A
and g might be negatively correlated in our sample period; that is, reductions in taxes and increases
in government expenditures, both of which are important components of fiscal stimulus packages,
have often been announced simultaneously during the post-bubble period.
25
The variable, gt, is defined as announced additional issue of “construction bonds,” a type of
government bond that is issued specifically for financing public investments, divided by the
nominal GDP.  The variable, gt, takes positive values 15 times in the sample period of 1975 to
                                                
24 Giavazzi and Pagano (1995) found a large negative error in the consumption function during the Swedish
fiscal expansion of the early 1990s, and suggested that this was due to a downward revision in the permanent
disposable income that was triggered by the fiscal expansion.
25 Tax reductions and increases in government spending are announced on the same month in nine episodes
out of the 43 in our data set.27
1998.
26  The first column of Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis, in which gt is
added to the specification [2] of Table 3.  Contrary to the implications of the hypothesis of non-
Keynesian effects, the coefficient on gt, k, was positive (p-value=0.076), which means that
announcements about additional government spending have a positive impact on the private
consumption, rather than a negative one.  In this sense, we fail to find evidence in Japanese data for
the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal expansion.
27  Reflecting the positive estimate of k, the estimate
of f1 is much smaller than before, which is also contrary to our ex-ante expectation.  The second
column of Table 5, which adds gt into the specification [3] of Table 3, reports similar results.
Finally, we address the possibility that the effect of a tax reduction and that of a tax increase
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The variable v
IP+ represents when and how much permanent increases in taxes and social
security contributions are implemented.  Likewise, the variable v
IP- represents permanent reductions
                                                
26 The Japanese government announced policy packages, which included additional government spending,
on the following dates: 09/17/75, 09/03/77, 09/02/78, 10/08/82, 10/21/83, 10/15/85, 09/19/86, 07/24/87,
08/28/92, 04/13/93, 09/16/93, 02/08/94, 04/14/95, 09/20/95, 04/24/98.
27 Note that the government spending shock that we pick up here is a temporary one.  That is, when the
Japanese government increases spending as a part of stimulus package, it tends to increase spending for
short-life projects (typically, less than one year) to make undesirable impacts on public debt as small as
possible.  This is in sharp contrast with Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1995) where the argument was focused
on changes in consumers’ expectations in response to permanent changes in government expenditures.  In28







defined in the same way.
28  Using these disaggregated tax variables, equation (5) can be expressed
as:
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where m1 and m2 are parameters measuring the degree of asymmetry concerning the impacts of tax
changes.  Note that, if m1=m2=1/2, the effects of tax changes are symmetric and equation (7) reduces
to equation (5).
We estimate equation (7) under two different parameter restrictions.  The first column of
Table 6 uses the same specification as the second column of Table 3, except that asymmetric
effects of tax changes are allowed.  The coefficients of interest, m1 and m2, are both positive and less
than one.  However, the estimate of m1 was 0.0105, which is close to zero, while that of m2 was
0.3376, which is fairly close to 1/2.  Using the Wald test, the null hypothesis that m1 equals 1/2 is
rejected at the one per cent significance level, but the hypothesis that m2 equals to 1/2 is not
rejected.  Thus, the announcement effects of tax changes on consumer spending are asymmetric:
the impact of tax increases on consumer spending is significantly larger than that of tax
reductions.
29  On the other hand, the impact of tax changes at the timing of implementation, i.e., the
                                                                                                                                                                
this sense, it might not be appropriate to interpret our results as evidence against the argument of Giavazzi
and Pagano.




29 An interpretation of this result is that tax cut promises are less credible than tax increase promises.29
impact of tax changes through the spending behaviour of near-rational consumers, is symmetric.
These findings are consistent with those obtained through the preliminary analysis in Section 3.1.
The second column of Table 6, which is an asymmetric version of the specification [3] of Table 3,
reports a similar result.
3.4.  Effects of the tax policy in 1993–98    Table 7 presents the effects of the tax policy in
1993–98, which are estimated using the regression results of the specification [3], in Table 3.  The
figures of the table represent the contributions of changes in taxes to the annual growth rate of
consumption.  For example, the first column of the table represents the contributions of permanent
income-tax reductions through the spending behaviour of current income consumers.
From Table 7, it is evident that the contributions through the spending behaviour of near-
rational consumers are dominantly large.  For example, the third column indicates that the
permanent tax reduction of 1995 contributes about 0.6 per cent to the growth rate of consumption
in 1995.  Also, the sixth column indicates that the temporary tax reductions contribute between 0.3
and 0.8 per cent every year through the spending behaviour of those consumers.
30
                                                
30 Note that the estimated impacts of tax changes shown in Table 7 might contain nonnegligible errors,
which come from the errors of the estimated parameters.  In particular, since the discount factor b is
imprecisely estimated, the impacts of temporary tax changes might be imprecise.  The discount factor is
estimated to be 0.9053 with the standard error of 0.1059 in [3] of Table 3, which means that the per-month
discount rate is 9.47 per cent.  This figure is, admittedly, too large.  Although the main arguments of the
paper depends solely on the result that the estimated discount factor is significantly different from zero
(therefore, temporary tax changes have weaker effects relative to permanent changes) and not on how close
it is to the unity, it is true that the estimated discount factor that is far from the unity makes the impacts of
temporary tax changes extremely large.  For example, if we change the value of b from 0.9053 to 0.9900,30
The consumption-tax increase of 1997 had a large negative impact on the growth rate of
consumption in 1997, through the weakening of the spending behaviour of near-rational consumers,
as well as current income consumers, as shown on the seventh and ninth columns of Table 7.  The
contribution through near-rational consumers is -0.8 per cent, which is more than twice as large as
that through current income consumers.  A larger contribution through near-rational consumers
implies that a temporary tax reduction will not be effective enough to compensate deterioration in
consumer spending due to the permanent increase in the consumption tax rate.
The announcement effects of tax policy were quite limited, as indicated by the near-zero
estimates of f1 in Table 7.  For example, the announcement effect of the permanent tax-reduction
of 1995 was less than 0.2 per cent and that of the consumption-tax increase was about -0.2 per cent.
4.  Near-rationality of the Japanese consumers?    The regression analyses in the previous
section indicate that a fairly large fraction of forward-looking consumers, who distinguish between
temporary and permanent tax changes, respond to tax changes, not at the time of the policy
announcement but at the time of implementation.  They deviate from the optimal path of
consumption in the sense that they ignore policy announcements, and thus are labelled near-rational
consumers in Section 2.  To reinforce this interpretation, we calculate in this section how much
utility these near-rational consumers lose by deviating from the optimal path of consumption,
following the methodology of Cochrane (1989).
Consider the optimization problem:
                                                                                                                                                                
which is within one standard error of the estimate, the estimated impact of temporary tax reduction in 1995
through the behaviour of near-rational consumers decreases from +0.79 to +0.08.31










subject to the appropriate budget constraint, and write the optimal path of consumption as Ct* and
the actual path by Ct. The utility gained from the optimal path is U*, and that gained from the
actual path is U.  The second-order Taylor expansion gives:
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Note that the first sum of the right-hand side of equation (9) is zero for any feasible deviation from
the optimal path of consumption.  The utility costs can be approximated by the second sum of the
right-hand side of equation (9).  We divide the second sum by the corresponding marginal utility,
evaluated at the optimal consumption level.  This transforms the utility value expression into a yen-
equivalent expression.  Dividing the second sum by the optimal consumption level, we express the











































































where g is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Let L3 denote the utility loss of near-rational consumers relative to permanent income
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where the second equality follows from equations (2.2) and (2.3).  Note that the utility loss of near-
rational consumers is caused by their sub-optimal responses to changes in taxes and social security
contributions.  The variable, c2t, in equation (11) is implicitly defined by:
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where the second equality follows from the restriction, f1+f2=1.  Similarly, we can define L1, the
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where the second equality follows from equations (2.1) and (2.2).
Table 8 reports the utility losses corresponding to the estimates obtained in the specification
[3] of Table 3.  The table expresses utility losses in percentage points, relative to the optimal
consumption.  The second column of the table shows L3 for various values of the coefficient of
relative risk aversion.  The utility losses are 0.003 per cent for g=1, and 0.033 per cent for g=10.
Even when g is as high as 30, the loss is 0.098 per cent.  We conclude from these figures that the
welfare losses, which the forward-looking consumers who ignore policy announcements have to
pay, are quite small.  In this sense, they are qualified to be called near-rational consumers.  On the
other hand, the utility losses of current income consumers, which are shown on the first column of
the table, range from 0.009 per cent to 0.282 per cent for g between 1 and 30.
31  The figures are
                                                
31 Campbell and Mankiw (1991) calculates the welfare losses of current income consumers using the data of
various countries.  For example, their estimate for the U.S. is about two per cent for the case of g=30.  In33
about three times those of near-rational consumers, but do not indicate a serious welfare loss.  The
third column of the table presents the average utility losses across different types of consumer,
which range from 0.004 per cent to 0.130 per cent for g between 1 and 30.
32
5.  Conclusion    Do the impacts of tax reductions on consumer spending depend on whether they
are permanent or temporary?  If so, what would be the difference?  Do the announcements of tax
reductions affect consumer spending?  To prepare an empirical answer to these questions, we
would need a data set that distinguishes between temporary and permanent reductions in spending,
as well as anticipated and unanticipated changes in taxes.  One method that provides these
distinctions is the use of institutional information, such as the legal distinction between temporary
and permanent changes, as well as the timing of policy announcements and their implementations.
Using a data set including this institutional information for 43 episodes of changes in taxes
and social security contributions in Japan during the period of 1975–98, we found that more than
three-quarters of Japanese consumers are forward-looking consumers who distinguish between
temporary and permanent tax changes.  The fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers, or Keynesian-
type consumers, whose spending depends on current income rather than permanent income, is less
than a quarter.  We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the fraction of Ricardian consumers is
zero.
                                                                                                                                                                
addition, Caballero (1995) calculates the welfare losses of those who are characterized by infrequent actions
to shocks.  The estimate is about one per cent for the case of g=30.
32 These calculations assume that (1) consumers face no idiosyncratic risk with respect to disposable income;
and (2) consumers respond optimally to shocks other than tax changes.  The welfare losses could be much
larger if these assumptions are not satisfied.34
The response of forward-looking consumers to temporary changes in taxes is significantly
smaller than that for permanent tax changes.  The regression results, reported in this paper, show
that a permanent tax reduction of 10,000 yen per month would increase the monthly spending of a
forward-looking consumer by about 10,000 yen.  However, a one-time tax reduction of the same
size would increase the spending of the forward-looking consumer by less than 1000 yen.
We have also found that more than 80 per cent of Japanese consumers respond to changes in
taxes not at the timing of policy announcements but at the timing of their implementations.  This is
consistent with two regularities repeatedly observed in the empirical studies on consumer
behaviour: excess smoothness and excess sensitivity of consumption.  However, our findings are
new in that, not only rule-of-thumb consumers, but also a part of forward-looking consumers, who
distinguish between temporary and permanent tax changes, ignore policy announcements.  We
suggest an explanation that forward-looking consumers who ignore policy announcements follow a
near-rational decision rule.  For those consumers, the utility gained by using policy announcements
to better adjust consumption, does not outweigh the costs of obtaining and processing the
information, while that gained by distinguishing between temporary and permanent tax changes is
large relative to the costs.  The estimated utility cost of ignoring policy announcements is less than
0.1 per cent of the PIH consumption.35
Appendix A: Major tax reforms in Japan
This appendix gives a brief description of the major tax reforms in Japan during the post-war
period: The Nakasone Tax Reform in 1987, the Takeshita Tax Reform in 1988, and the 1994 Tax
Reform.
The Nakasone Tax Reform    The Nakasone Tax Reform in 1987 aimed at achieving equality,
fairness and simplicity of taxation by changing the basic structure of the existing tax system that
had been untouched since the tax reform in 1949, based on the recommendation by the Shoup
mission.  The existing tax system was considered unequal not only vertically but also
horizontally.
33  It was also criticized for unfair treatment of investment income: interest was exempt
from income taxation up to a certain level, and capital gains from selling stocks were not taxed in
principle.
34  In September 1987, the Nakasone administration solved these problems, at least
partially, by: (1) reducing the income tax burden, especially for the middle-income salaried
workers, by two trillion yen; (2) simplifying the rate structure for income tax from 15 brackets with
the top marginal rate of 70 per cent to 12 brackets with the top marginal rate of 60 per cent; and (3)
taxing interest by a withholding tax at the rate of 20 per cent.
                                                
33 It was considered horizontally unequal because of the “10:5:3:1 problem”: labour income of salaried
workers is reported in full to the tax authority, while the self-employed can declare only 50 per cent of what
they earn, farmers 30 per cent, and politicians a mere 10 per cent.
34 Another complaint about the existing tax system was the excessively high corporate income tax burden.
The effective corporate income tax rate was 53 per cent in 1984, significantly higher than those in the major
industrial countries.36
The Takeshita Tax Reform    Inheriting the key concepts of the Nakasone Tax Reform, the
Takeshita administration emphasized the importance of introducing VAT as an alternative revenue
source in reducing the income-tax burden substantially.
35  In July 1988, the Takeshita
administration succeeded in introducing the so-called consumption tax, a Japanese version of VAT,
with the tax rate of three per cent, as well as flattening the schedule of the income tax rate by
reducing the number of brackets to five, with the top marginal rate of 50 per cent.  The income tax
reduction amounted to three trillion yen, while additional revenue from the introduction of the
consumption tax was 3.3 trillion yen in FY1989, 5.7 per cent of the national tax revenue.
The 1994 Tax Reform    On January 1, 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa proposed to abandon the
consumption tax and introduce a new tax, named “welfare tax,” a kind of VAT, the revenue of
which would be used specifically for government expenditure necessary to make the transition to
the ageing society easier.  Although the ruling parties rejected the Prime Minister’s initial idea,
discussion lead to a consensus that the consumption tax rate should be increased in anticipation of
the expected social security outlays in the 21st century, and that income tax rates should be
decreased to give incentives to middle-income workers.  In September 1994, the Diet passed the
tax-reform bills, in which the consumption tax rate was raised from three to five per cent, and the
progressiveness of the income tax was relaxed, especially for the range of seven to 15 million yen
annual income.  The tax mix of consumption-tax increase and income tax reduction was designed
                                                
35 The Nakasone administration tried to introduce VAT, but failed because of opposition from small- and
medium-sized businesses in the wholesale and retail trades, as well as taxpayers who showed a strong
resentment against the regressive structure of the VAT.37
to be revenue neutral: the consumption tax increase to create additional revenue of four trillion yen,
while the income-tax cut to reduce revenue by 3.7 trillion yen.
36
Appendix B: An outline of the Japanese social insurance system
The social insurance programme in Japan consists of three major components: public pensions,
medical care insurance, and labour insurance.  This appendix gives a brief summary of each
insurance system, with a special focus on contributions/premiums the insured persons need to pay.
Public pensions    The public pension system in Japan is a two-tier system: the flat-rate basic
benefit and the earnings-related benefits.  The first tier, the Basic Benefits (Kiso-Nenkin), covers all
residents, irrespective of whether they are employed or not.  The second tier consists of two types
of funds: the Employees’ Pension Fund (Kosei-Nenkin) for private-sector employees; and the
Cooperative Pension Funds (Kyosai-Nenkin) for government employees, private school teachers,
etc.  Independent workers, the self-employed and jobless persons are covered only by the Basic
Benefits, but employees are also covered by the Employees’ Pension Fund or the Cooperative
Pension Funds.
                                                
36 At the beginning of 1994, it was a political consensus that the government should stimulate the economy
by income tax reductions as soon as possible.  However, the income tax reduction, in the bills passed in
September 1994, was scheduled to start in January 1995.  To fill the gap, the government implemented a
temporary tax reduction of 5.5 trillion yen in 1994.  In 1995, the income tax reductions, in the 1994 tax
reform package, were 3.7 trillion yen, plus a temporary tax reduction of 2.0 trillion yen, to keep the total
amount of tax reductions as large as that implemented in 1994.38
The major programme in the Basic Benefits is the old-age pensions.
37  The full old age
pension, 65,000 yen per month, is payable from age 65, provided that 40 years of contributions
were made.  The monthly contribution, which is independent of the income of the insured, is
currently 13,000 yen.  Those who are covered only by the Basic Benefits are required to pay this
amount individually to social security offices, while those who are covered by the Employees’
Pension Fund or the Cooperative Pension Fund are not required to do so because they pay
contributions indirectly through those funds.
The full old age pension of the Employees’ Pension Fund is 30 per cent of his/her career
average monthly real earnings, and payable from age 60, provided that 40 years of contributions
were made.  The average benefit for those who started to receive benefits in April 1997 is about
202,000 yen per month.  Under the Employees’ Pension Fund, equal percentage contributions are
required of employees and their employers.  The monthly contributions are calculated by
multiplying the “monthly standard remuneration” by the contribution rate.  The “monthly standard
remuneration”, which consists of wages, salaries, allowances, and all other cash income paid to an
employee for services rendered, is revised once a year, in August, based on the average income of
the insured in May through June of the year.  The contribution rate, currently 17.35 per cent, is
revised every four or five years
38 based on the government’s reassessment of the future path of
benefits and contributions.  The employers are obliged to pay the total contributions (both from
                                                
37 The Basic Benefits include not only old-age pensions, but also disability and survivors’ pensions, etc.
38 During our sample period, changes in the contribution rate based on the reassessments were implemented
in 1976, 1980, 1985, 1989, 1990, and 1994.  See Table A1 for the exact dates of implementation as well as
announcement.39
employers and employees) for a given month to the social insurance office by the end of the next
month, and, to do so, they collect contributions from the employees in the next month.
Medical care insurance    Medical care insurance consists of Health Insurance for employees and
National Health Insurance for the self-employed.  Both are systems of paying medical care benefits
and allowances to the employees of business firms and their families when they are taken ill or
injured.  Premiums of the Health Insurance are determined by multiplying the monthly standard
remuneration of the insured person by the prescribed premium rate.  The premium rate for Health
Insurance, which is now 8.5 per cent of the monthly standard remuneration, is revised every five
years.
Labour insurance    Labour insurance consists of two kinds of insurance: Workers’ Accident
Compensation Insurance, a protection against injury, disease, disability or death resulting from an
employment, and Employment Insurance, or unemployment compensation.  Premiums for the two
insurances are calculated by multiplying the total amount of wages paid to workers by the
corresponding premium rates.  Premiums for the Workers’ Accident Compensation Insurance are
paid by the employers.  Premiums for the Employment Insurance are paid by both the employers
and the employees.  At present, the premium rate is 1.45 per cent, of which 0.9 per cent is borne by
the employers and 0.55 per cent by the employees.40
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</ref_section>Table 1.
Changes in income tax and consumption tax, 1993-1998
Changes in income tax         Changes in




CY1993 - -0.1 -
CY1994 -5.5 -0.1 -
CY1995 -2.0 -3.6 -
CY1996 -2.0 -3.6 -
CY1997 - -3.6 +3.1




CY1993 - -5.0 -
CY1994 -40.4 -6.5 -
CY1995 -26.6 -31.0 -
CY1996 -26.3 -33.3 -
CY1997 - -33.3 +41.0
CY1998 -137.5 -38.3 +54.0
1) A married family with two children.  Before-tax annual income is 5 million yen.Table 2.
Propensity to consume out of income
                     Mean of monthly changes in propensity to
                     consume out of income
All items Nondurables
       and services
Durables
   Full sample (OBS=281)  -0.00033  -0.00043 +0.00010
   nt
I < 0 (OBS= 34) +0.00288 ** +0.00151 * +0.00137 *
   nt
I = 0 (OBS=241)  -0.00057  -0.00055  -0.00002
   nt
I > 0 (OBS=  6)  -0.00901 **  -0.00682 **  -0.00219
   nt
A < 0 (OBS= 16)  -0.00079 †  -0.00100 +0.00021 †
   nt
A = 0 (OBS=260)  -0.00015  -0.00025 +0.00010
   nt
A > 0 (OBS=  5)  -0.00853 ††  -0.00821 ††  -0.00032 †
 ** Different from the no-implementation mean value at the 5% level (one-tailed).
  *  Different from the no-implementation mean value at the 10% level (one-tailed).
 †† Different from the no-announcement mean value at the 5% level (one-tailed).
  †  Different from the no-announcement mean value at the 10% level (one-tailed).Table 3.
Baseline regression results




IT ut u t t = - - + - - - + - + - - + lD lf b lf b lq l e ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ] {( ) $ ( ) } 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 OR
   Perameter
   restrictions
No b b 1 2 =      b b 1 2 =
f f 1 2 1 + =
No      b b 1 2 =      b b 1 2 =
f f 1 2 1 + =
  Regression
  method
NLLS NLLS NLLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
   l  0.2385  0.2408  0.2371  0.3074  0.3156  0.2897
( 0.0523) ( 0.0519) ( 0.0513) ( 0.1103) ( 0.1084) ( 0.1020)
   f1  0.5919  0.4639  0.1978  0.5012  0.3041  0.0554
( 0.6234) ( 0.5488) ( 0.3130) ( 0.6915) ( 0.5135) ( 0.3138)
   f2  0.9779  1.0268  1.3093  1.3716
( 0.5195) ( 0.5086) ( 0.6578) ( 0.6525)
   b1  0.9817  0.9418  0.9053  0.9841  0.9155  0.8702
( 0.0940) ( 0.0783) ( 0.1059) ( 0.1230) ( 0.0772) ( 0.1068)
   b2  0.9168  0.9045
( 0.1056) ( 0.0866)
   q  0.2922  0.2869  0.2934          -          -          -
( 0.1327) ( 0.1325) ( 0.1310)
    R
2  0.2192  0.2215  0.2233  0.2133  0.2155  0.2166
  Wald test: f f 1 2 1 + =
  Chi-squared
  statistic










1)  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Intercept and the coefficients on the two dummy variables
associated with changes in consumption tax rate are not reported.   b0 099 = . .
2)  [4], [5] and [6] are estimated by 2SLS, instrumenting for D dt with D dt-2 ,...,D dt-6 ,D ct-2 ,...,D ct-6.Table 4.
Sensitivity analysis
Measurement





       Delete the
     observation of





    Consumption
         durability
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
   l  0.2348  0.2410  0.2357  0.2347  0.2181
( 0.0520) ( 0.0519) ( 0.0515) ( 0.0417) ( 0.0638)
   f1  0.4345  0.4561  0.7817  0.2130  0.4421
( 0.7082) ( 0.5483) ( 0.5322) ( 0.4959) ( 0.6106)
   f2  0.5022  0.9046  0.8892  0.8224  0.9134
( 0.5380) ( 0.5462) ( 0.4687) ( 0.4104) ( 0.5754)
   b1  0.8814  0.9383  0.8890  0.9977  0.9362
( 0.2008) ( 0.0868) ( 0.0848) ( 0.0816) ( 0.0950)
   q  0.3028  0.3049  0.2966  0.2644  0.3323
( 0.1309) ( 0.1329) ( 0.1300) ( 0.1061) ( 0.1162)
   r                   -                   -                  -                      -  0.1579
( 0.2434)
    R
2  0.2175  0.2209  0.2306  0.2702  0.2191
   Wald test: f f 1 2 1 + =
  Chi-squared
  statistic











   Regression
   method TSLS NLLS NLLS NLLS NLLS
Notes :
1)  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Intercept and the coefficients on the two dummy variables associated with changes
in consumption tax rate are not reported.  b0 099 = . .
2)  The first column reestimates the specification [2] of table 3, instrumenting for the change in tax and social security




IT.  The dummy variable corresponding
to v
AP takes the value of +1 in months when v
AP>0, -1 when v
AP<0 and zero otherwise. The other three dummy
variables are defined in the same way.
3)  The second column reestimates the specification [2] of table 3, deleting the observations related with changes in
consumption tax rate: 1989:03, 1989:04, 1997:03, and 1997:04.
4)  The third column reestimates the specification [2] of table 3, deleting the observation of December 1997.
5)  The fourth column reestimates the specification [2] of table 3, using expenditures on nondurables and services as
dependent variable.
6)  The fifth column estimates equation (6) in text.  Standard errors shown on the fifth column are Newey-West estimator.Table 5.
Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal expansion?




IT ut gt t = - - + - - - + - + - + + lD lf b lf b lq k h ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) $ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
   Perameter
   restrictions
b b 1 2 = b b 1 2 =
f f 1 2 1 + =
[1] [2]
   l  0.2510  0.2494
( 0.0521) ( 0.0516)
   f1  0.1853  0.0592
( 0.5130) ( 0.3448)
   f2  1.0566
( 0.5222)
   b1  0.9298  0.9104
( 0.0925) ( 0.1023)
   q  0.2756  0.2788
( 0.1347) ( 0.1337)
   k  0.2032  0.2099
( 0.1143) ( 0.1131)
    R
2  0.2276  0.2302
   Wald test: f f 1 2 1 + =
  Chi-squared
  statistic
   p-value
 0.1085
 0.7419
   Regression
   method NLLS NLLS
Notes :
1)  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Intercept and the coefficients on the two dummy variables associated
with changes in consumption tax rate are not reported.   b0 099 = . .
2)  The variable gt represents additional government expenditures announced at t.  It is measured by the
additional issue of government construction bonds divided by the nominal GDP.Table 6.
Asymmetric effects of tax changes?
D c d u t t t = + - lD lq ( ) $ 1
- - - + + - - +








- - - + + - - + +









   Perameter
   restrictions
b b 1 2 = b b 1 2 =
f f 1 2 1 + =
[1] [2]
   l  0.2453  0.2318
( 0.0519) ( 0.0510)
   f1  1.0811  0.4851
( 0.5888) ( 0.3683)
   f2  1.0258
( 0.5217)
   b1  0.8842  0.6234
( 0.1847) ( 1.1548)
   q  0.2767  0.2994
( 0.1338) ( 0.1298)
   m1  0.0105  0.0045
( 0.1831) ( 0.1438)
   m2  0.3376  0.2159
( 0.2641) ( 0.5360)
    R
2  0.2253  0.2222
   Wald test:  m1= 0.5
  Chi-squared
  statistic





   Wald test:  m2 = 0.5
  Chi-squared
  statistic





   Regression
   method NLLS NLLS
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Intercept and the coefficients on the two dummy variables associated
with changes in consumption tax rate are not reported.   b0 099 = . .Table 7.
Estimated effects of the tax policy in 1993-1998




permanent income-tax reduction temporary income-tax reduction consumption tax increase
current income
consumers
     permanent
     income
     consumers
   near-rational
   consumers
current income
consumers
     permanent
     income
     consumers
   near-rational
   consumers
current income
consumers
     permanent
     income
     consumers
   near-rational
   consumers
CY1993 +0.00 +0.02 +0.01   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 +0.34
CY1994 +0.01 +0.06 +0.09 +0.32 +0.24 +0.42   0.00  -0.06   0.00  -1.49
CY1995 +0.23 +0.11 +0.63  -0.11 +0.12 +0.79   0.00  -0.12   0.00 +1.06
CY1996  -0.24 +0.00 +0.14  -0.02 +0.12 +0.63   0.00   0.00   0.00  -0.02
CY1997   0.00 +0.00   0.00  -0.20 +0.03 +0.33  -0.31   0.00  -0.80  -0.22
CY1998   0.00 +0.02   0.00 +0.70 +0.41 +0.34 +0.32   0.00  -0.28        -
Notes :
1)  Contributions of the tax reduction/increase are calculated using the estimated result shown in [3] of table 3.
2)  The growth rate of consumption in a year is defined as the annual average of the consumption divided by the level of consumption in December of the previous year.  The percentage
contribution of changes in taxes is defined in the same way.Table 8.
Utility losses of the current income consumers and the
near-rational consumers
Loss of the current
income consumers
L1
Loss of the near-
       rational consumers
L3
Weighted average
l l f L L 1 3 1 1 + - - ( )( )
g =1 0.009 0.003 0.004
g = 2 0.019 0.007 0.009
g =5 0.047 0.016 0.022
g =10 0.094 0.033 0.043
g = 30 0.282 0.098 0.130
Note: Losses are expressed in percentage points, as a fraction of the consumption level of
the type 2 consumer.  ã is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  See text for the
details of calculation.Table A1.
Chronology of changes in income tax, consumption tax,
and















  or permanent
4)
04/01/75 12/26/74 -0.464 N P
06/01/75 12/26/74 -0.314 L P
09/01/76 02/09/76 +0.521 S P
04/01/77 01/10/77 -0.557 N P
06/01/77 01/10/77 -0.195 L P
06/01/77 03/09/77 -0.053 N T
06/01/78 02/28/78 -0.049 N T
06/01/79 01/11/79 -0.119 L P
06/01/80 12/29/79 -0.046 L P
11/01/80 02/28/80 +0.228 S P
12/01/81 10/13/81 -0.005 N T
12/01/83 10/21/83 -0.016 N T
04/01/84 01/20/84 -0.298 N P
06/01/84 01/20/84 -0.194 L P
11/01/85 01/24/84 +0.557 S P
10/01/87 07/24/87 -0.844 N P
06/01/88 07/24/87 -0.522 L P
09/01/88 07/26/88 -0.023 N T
01/01/89 06/14/88 -0.625 N P
04/01/89 06/14/88 +0.749 C P
06/01/89 06/14/88 -0.548 L P
02/01/90 02/27/89 +0.751 S P
12/01/93 04/08/93 -0.073 N P
06/01/94 04/08/93 -0.044 L P
06/01/94 02/10/94 -0.029 N T
06/01/94 02/10/94 -0.025 L T
07/01/94 02/10/94 -0.028 L T
12/01/94 02/10/94 -0.019 N T
12/01/94 03/01/94 +0.708 S P
01/01/95 09/22/94 -0.412 N P
06/01/95 09/22/94 -0.023 N T
06/01/95 09/22/94 -0.022 L T
06/01/95 09/22/94 -0.336 L P12/01/95 09/22/94 -0.022 N T
06/01/96 12/20/95 -0.021 N T
06/01/96 12/20/95 -0.023 L T
12/01/96 12/20/95 -0.016 N T
04/01/97 09/22/94 +1.042 C P
02/01/98 12/19/97 -0.075 N T
06/01/98 12/19/97 -0.071 L T
08/01/98 04/09/98 -0.084 N T
12/01/98 12/19/97 -0.070 N P
06/01/99 12/19/97 -0.028 L P
Notes :
1)  For changes in income tax and consumption tax, the announcement date is defined as the date
on which the LDP tax committee submits “Outline of tax reform,” a proposal describing the
details of the tax reform, to the government.  For changes in social security contribution, the
announcement date is defined as the date on which the advisory committee for social security
system submits a report to the minister of health and welfare.
2)  Percent.  For permanent changes, figures indicate a per-month change divided by the
monthly income.  For temporary changes, figures indicate the amount of change multiplied
by the discount rate, 0.01 per-month, and divided by the monthly income.
3)  N, L, C and S represent, respectively, national income tax, local income tax, consumption
tax, and social security contribution.
4)  T and P represent, respectively, temporary and permanent changes in taxes and social
security contributions.